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Keynote Lecture: University of Minnesota Law

MJIL Law Conference (November 4, 2019)
The Limits of Equality and Gender Discourses in
Counter-Terrorism: The Case of Women and
Children in Syria and IraqI
Fionnuala Ni Aoldin*
Recent years have felt like an exercise in constant whiplash
as lawyers and scholars valiantly seek to assess and comprehend
the events taking place on the ground in Turkey, the Northern
Syrian Arab Republic and Iraq. There is much that can be said
about all of it, but these remarks are focused on the position for
women and children in the Northern Syrian Arab Republic and
Iraq being held (for now) in detention camps controlled by the
Syrian Democratic Forces ("SDF") or being held in Iraqi prisons
pending trial for a variety of offences premised on or related to
Islamic State ("IS") proximity.

2

The conditions in such camps are deeply distressing and
reach the threshold of "torture, inhuman and degrading"
treatment under international law. There is limited access to
food and water, shelter is precarious and inadequate, conditions

1. This keynote draws in part on a position paper previously issued by the
Special Rapporteur, available at https://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Terrorism/
Pages/Statements.aspx.
* I acknowledge the support of the UKRI Gender, Justice and Security
Hub (http://www.lse.ac.uk/women-peace-security/research/Gender-Justice-and
-Security-Hub) in the completion of this research for this publication.
2. A 2019 report "estimates that up to 4,761 (or 13 per cent) of those who
travelled to Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic were women." United Nations
Sec. Council, Counter-Terrorism Comm. Exec. Directorate, Gender Dimensions
of the Response to Returning Foreign Terrorist Fighters: Research Perspectives
CTED Trends Report February 2019, at 6 (2019). "There were, however, some
notable regional differences. Eastern Asia contributed the highest proportion of
women to its FTF population (35 per cent), followed by Eastern Europe (23 per
cent), Western Europe (17 per cent) and the Americas, Australia and New
Zealand (17 per cent); Central Asia (13 per cent) and South-Eastern Asia (13
per cent), Southern Asia (12 per cent), Middle East and North Africa (MENA)
(6 per cent), and Sub-Saharan Africa (<1 per cent)." Id.
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for children are poor leading to illness and premature death,
medical provision is sparse, many detainees are subject to
interrogation without minimum due process guarantees and
potentially trial for terrorism related offences. 3 In parallel, there
is evidence of an ongoing informal presence of Islamic State in
Iraq and the Northern Syrian Arab Republic ("ISIS") authorities
of various forms within the camps meaning that girls, women
and their children continue to be subject to the coercive control
of non-State groups even as they are held by state or quasi-state
authorities. In Iraq, some children are held with their mothers
who have been sentenced to death by Iraqi courts for their
association with ISIS. Prison conditions in Iraq are overcrowded
and structurally poor; concerns abound around ill-treatment in
custody as well as inadequate conditions of confinement for
4
women and children.
First, a word about nomenclature. Feminist scholars have
long paid attention to terminology recognizing the discursive
5
and power attributes of language use and characterization.
Various scholars, policy makers, and United Nations entities use
different words to describe the groups discussed here. They
include "ISIL associated women", "women and children with
links to United Nations Listed Terrorist Groups," and "Foreign
Fighters and their families" to name but a few. One of the
challenges with all of these terms is that they inherently define
and categorize women and children by virtue of their association
with particular men or groups of men. It would seem to state the
very obvious that in defining the legal rights and responsibilities
of any group, we start from the premise of their individuality
and individual status and not assume their legal rights and
entitlements flow by virtue of the man with whom they are
attached. The pitfall of associative status for women is a well3. In respect of Iraq, prosecutions of most foreign fighters fall under Iraq's
Anti-Terrorism Law. The death penalty is applicable to crimes contained in that
law. The law's definition of terrorism is overly broad and ambiguous. AntiTerrorism Law of 2005 No. 13 of 2005 (Iraq); OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS
HIGH COMM'R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR
IRAQ, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN IRAQ: TRIALS
UNDER THE ANTI-TERRORISM
LAWS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR JUSTICE,
ACCOUNTABILITY AND SOCIAL COHESION IN THE AFTERMATH OF ISIL (Jan. 2020).

4. Agn6s Callamard (Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary, or

Arbitrary Executions), Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial,
Summary or Arbitrary Executions on Her Mission to Iraq, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/38/44/Add. 1, (June 5, 2018).
5. See in particular French post-structural feminism. See, e.g., Helene
Cixous et. al., The Laugh of the Medusa, 1 SIGNS 875, 876 (1976).
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trodden patriarchal road that has been broadly abandoned (at
least rhetorically) in other international law areas, including,
but not limited, to global regulation in health, environment,
international criminal law, refugee law and more. However, it
appears to have a curious persistence in the context of
discussions concerning the women and children who are
presently found in Iraq and the Northern Syrian Arab Republic
and that have been identified as combatants, supporters, victims
or some version of all of the above in relation to armed groups
such as Islamic State, Jabhat Fatah al-Sham (formerly Jabhat
al-Nusra), Ahar al-Sham and Hezbollah. The core point I
emphasize in the necessary attention to naming, is the extent to
which the 'what' and 'how' of naming these women and children
defines almost all else that follows, and has become a convenient
starting point from which States have defended their decisions
to avoid return of their citizens to countries of birth, origin or
citizenship.
The second broad comment is aptly made when this
conference takes place in the week following the multiple
celebrations of the Women, Peace and Security ("WPS") agenda
held in New York. This has become a yearly ritual in which
States broadly congratulate themselves for the inclusion of
women in the peace and security arena. The WPS agenda, which
I have written about extensively,6 was birthed by United
Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 and is shaped around
three pillars of women's inclusion in the peace and security
space: prevention (of violence), protection (from violence) and
participation (in peacemaking and post-conflict reconstruction).
As I and other commentators have noted elsewhere, 7 the WPS
agenda has been marked by various fault-lines and hierarchies,
including the conflicts to which the agenda is deemed to apply.
But most obviously in this context, WPS shows its distinct
limitations by demarking the women (and girls) who are
included into the prevention and protection mantras offered and

6.

FIONNUALA NI AOLAIN ET AL., ON THE FRONTLINES: GENDER, WAR, AND

THE POST-CONFLICT PROCESS 208 (2011); Fionnuala Ni Aol6in and Nahla VaIji,
CriticalPerspectives on the Women, Peace and Security Agenda in The Women

Peace and Security Handbook (eds) Sara Davis and Jackie True (Oxford

University Press) (2019); Fionnuala Ni Aol6in, The War on Terror and

Extremism: Assessing the Relevance of the Women, Peace and Security Agenda,
92 INTL. AFF. 275, 275 91 (2016).
7. See PartI: The Security Council's WPS Agenda/Contemporary Survey,
in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF GENDER AND CONFLICT 103 96 (Fionnuala Ni

Aol6in et al. eds., 2018).
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those who are not. It has been patently clear that only certain
privileged groups of women and girls in the Northern Syrian
Arab Republic and Iraq are brought into the WPS 'tent' (whether
by States or the activist groups advocating to expand and
sustain WPS), and other distinctly languish outside it. The
consequences of this selective application is to weaken the
universality of WPS claim-making as a whole, to reveal obvious
(and historically) aligned fissures in the determination of
'deserving' and 'undeserving' women in international legal
discourses, and to further marginalize the women and children
who are the subject of global counter-terrorism regulation.
These women and girls, men and boys who are detained in
inhumane conditions in overcrowded camps, prisons, or
elsewhere in the Northern Syrian Arab Republic and Iraq are
rightly the subject of global concern. This population exists in
highly fluid, complex and intersecting conflict zones, surviving
precarious situations which impinge fundamentally on human
rights and international humanitarian law. Despite the broadly
agreed inhumane, degrading and increasingly dangerous
situations of their detention, there has been a patchy response
by States to ensuring return, reparation, rehabilitation,
8
reintegration and, where appropriate, prosecution of women.
A. SITUATING THE COMPLEXITY OF WOMEN'S EXPERIENCES
AND CHOICES IN THE NORTHERN SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC
AND IRAQ
Mobilization to join a non-State/terrorist group is a complex
and multifaceted process. There is no singular or linear path to
mobilization, but there are clearly pathways to mobilization and
it is possible to identify a range of factors that enable and sustain

8. Positive return practice includes the

example of Kosovo.

The

government started preparing to bring citizens home in 2017 when ISIS started
losing territory, including "providing medical help, psychiatric treatment and
counselling, housing, social services, special education, and reintegration."
Valerie Plesch & Serbeze Haxhiaj, Kosovo Is Trying to Reintegrate ISIL
Returnees. Will It Work?, ALJAZEERA (June 9, 2019), https://www.aljazeera.com/
indepth/features /kosovo-reintegrate-isil-returnees-work- 190608200858002.
html. The effort is being directed by Fatos Makolli, the new National
Coordinator of the Department for Countering Terrorism and Violent
Extremism, a department under the Prime Minister's office. In April 2019, the
government of Kosovo (with the help of the United States) repatriated 110 of its
citizens (four men, 32 women, and 74 children). Id.
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mobilization for men and women alike. 9 Those pathways have
gendered dimensions. Historically, there is far more evidence of
women being recruited by ethno-national armed groups than by
religious militants,1 0 a matter I have addressed in previous
work. 11
Complex questions emerge when we consider whether
women's engagement as combatants/terrorists and involvement
in violent acts should be interpreted as "a sign of women's
newfound empowerment" and simultaneously as "an indication
of ongoing gender oppression." 12 Terrorist organizations, as well
as non-State armed groups, have demonstrated remarkable
sensitivity to deploying gender-specific appeals to women as a
recruitment tactic. 13 They include feminist appeals for equal
participation, the offer of redemption to women who have
violated the gender norms of their own societies, revenge,
nationalism, and religious precept. 14 Remarkably, specific
mobilization efforts directed at the mothers of potential jihadists

9. United Nations Dev. Programme, Journey to Extremism in Africa:
Drivers,Incentives and the Tipping Pointfor Recruitment, at 4-5 (2017); Daniel
Milton & Brian Dodwell, Jihadi Brides? Examining a Female Guesthouse
Registry from the Islamic State's Caliphate, 11 CTC SENTINEL 16 (May 2018)
(examining the log of an ISIS guesthouse which presents a varied picture of the
reasons why women traveled and joined the Islamic State).
10.

See, e.g.,

DAGMAR HELLMANN-RAJANAYAGAM,

THE TAMIL TIGERS:

ARMED STRUGGLE FOR IDENTITY 69 71 (1994); Nur Bilge Criss, The Nature of
PKK Terrorism in Turkey, 18 STUD. CONFLICT & TERRORISM 17, 20 (1995)

(listing recruitment methods for the Kurdistan Worker's Party (PKK), which
included kidnapping young men and women).
11. See generally Fionnuala Ni Aol~in, Situation Women in
Counterterrorism Discourses: Undulating Masculinities and Luminal
Femininities, 93 B. U. L. Rev. 1085 (2013).
12. Anat Berko & Edna Erez, Gender, PalestinianWomen, and Terrorism:
Women's Liberationor Oppression?, 30 STUD. CONFLICT & TERRORISM 493, 503
(2007) ('The women's pathways to terrorism took various forms, were triggered
by different motives, and reflected different personal circumstances."). Note
that the study involved the semi-structured interviews of only fourteen women
incarcerated in Israeli prisons. The authors observe that the women
interviewed described themselves as both combatants and liberators and placed

their actions in the context of Israeli occupation. The interview analysis is made
more complex by the context of the study, in which Palestinian women detainees
were interviewed by Israeli researchers.
13.
See Lindsay A. O'Rourke, What's Special About Female Suicide
Terrorism?, 18 SEC. STUD. 681, 701 02 (2009).
14.
Id. at 701 (arguing that there are strong reasons for terrorist
organizations to select and encourage women suicide bombers whose
biographies depict the behavior of the target state in a negative light, including
women who have been sexually violated or who have lost a family member at
the hands of the state); id. at 702.
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indicate that some organizations specifically hone in on the
mothering dimensions of mobilization, at the very least to quell
mothers' objections to their sons' involvement in jihadist
movements. 15 Indeed, there is a deep and "paradoxical
relationship between women and contemporary religio-political
movements that advocate the re-traditionalization of women's
role as they actively mobilize women in public arenas."1 6
There are multiple variants of mobilization at play in the
emergence of girls and women's presence in the Caliphate. They
include girls and women who have travelled from European and
other Western states with partners or spouses to join non-State
armed groups; girls and women from the region who have
followed or supported non-State armed groups by virtue of
partners or by individual choice; girls and women who have been
forcibly kidnapped or coerced into sexual or other slavery during
the conquest of territory by non-State armed groups; girls
traveling autonomously but subject thereafter to sexual
exploitation and harm on joining or being associated with nonState armed groups and girls who have been groomed on-line
and then recruited and enabled to travel thereafter marrying,
and/or providing sexual or household services to their husbands,
as well as providing labour for the larger non-State armed
group/terrorist organization. 17 In all of these categories, girls
and women have given birth to children. Notably, across all of
18
these categories, multiple forms of marriage have taken place.
15.

See Farhat Haq, Militarism and Motherhood: The Women of the

Lashkar-i-Tayyabiain Pakistan, 32 SIGNS: J. WOMEN CULTURE & SOC'Y 1023
(2007) (quoting a speech by Hafiz Saeed, who recounted an elderly woman
telling him, "'I am a poor widow; I have done hard labor to bring these sons up.
Now I have heard the call of jihad. I have no money to give, but I have this
treasure, these sons. Take my second son and when he is martyred I will have
the third one ready."').
16. Id. at 1024; see also MALATHI DE ALwIS, Motherhood as a Space of
Protest: Women's Political Participation in Contemporary Sri Lanka, in
APPROPRIATING GENDER: WOMEN'S ACTIVISM AND POLITICIZED RELIGION IN

SOUTH ASIA 185,

186

(Patricia Jeffery

& Amrita Basu eds.,

1998)

(characterizing the Mothers' Front movement in Sri Lanka as one that drew

large female support using "essentialist views of women that reinforce the
notion of biology as destiny and legitimize a sex-role system that ... encourages
masculinized violence and destruction").
17. An apt summary of the complexity is provided by Diakonia Lebanon
International Humanitarian Law Resource Desk, The Legal Status of ISIS:
Affiliated ForeignNationals Held in Detention in North-EastSyria (Aug. 2019),
at 9 ("It must also be borne in mind that one female individual could 'bridge'
different categories, potentially being a minor, an orphan, a wife or widow, a
mother, a former combatant, and several or all of these at the same time.").
18. Rukmini Callimachi, The ISIS Files, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 4, 2018),
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Some of these marital unions only loosely map onto forms of
legally recognized union in the states of nationality for the girls
and women concerned. In all of these categories, girls and
women have given birth to children, at times from multiple
partners or spouses and generally quickly following the death of
one partner or spouse women were (re)married. In the case of
sexual slaves, girls and women were sold or passed on to other
militants.
I have argued that States of citizenship with the
responsibility for returning and reintegration must disaggregate
the experience of women and girls and recognize the complexity
of birthing, violence and gendered realities under the
Caliphate.19 An analysis of mobilization, including roles and
motivations, is necessary to understand the complexities of each
individual situation. Particular attention must be paid to women
and girls who have been forcibly kidnapped, coerced into sexual
or other slavery, subjected to sexual exploitation and harm on
joining or being associated with non-State armed groups as well
as to girls who have been groomed on-line and recruited and
enabled to travel marrying. States must also bear in mind that
the distinction between victims and perpetrators can be
complex, with returnees being victims of terrorism, trafficking,
slavery or sexual violence as well as perpetrators of criminal
offences. I have been particularly concerned about the view (and
practice through prosecution by some States) whereby maternal
responsibilities are taken as qualifying a woman as lending
,material support' to terrorism. I am equally struck by the lack
of nuance and complexity in primarily Western States'
positioning as regards women and children held in camps or
prisons in Iraq and Syria.

https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/04/04/world/middleeast/isis-

documents-mosul-iraq.html (noting that various forms of marriage and marital
union were sanctioned by ISIS had municipal offices issuing certificates for
marriage and births).
19. On the responsibility of States to their nationals found overseas in the
Syrian Arab Republic, see Extra-territorialjurisdiction of States over children
and their guardiansin camps, prisons, or elsewhere in the northern SyrianArab
Republic, UNITED

NATIONS

HUM.

RTS.

SPECIAL

PROCEDURES,

https://

www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Terrorism/UNSRsPublicJurisdictionAnalysi
s2020.pdf.
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B. CHILDREN: THE LEGAL AND MORAL OBLIGATIONS OF
STATES
There are few words to adequately capture the conditions
under which boys and girls are being birthed and living in
detention in Syria and Iraq. In these appalling circumstances of
daily life, not of their own making, returning children is a
humanitarian and human rights imperative. The argument that
children are not deserving of protection constitutes a moral
failure by their home countries, particularly those who have
ample resources.
State and non-State actors at all levels should affirm and
respect the fundamental vulnerability of children caught up in
armed conflict, through a range of circumstances almost always
not of their own making, or from contexts which have no
meaningful exit. Children enjoy special protection in accordance
with the Convention on the Rights of the Child and its Optional
Protocols as well as international humanitarian law. Children
must always be treated primarily as victims, while the best
interest of the child must always be a primary consideration.
There is no doubt that states have obligations to undertake
individualized assessments for each child, determining what
integration needs may be based on comprehensive, multiagency,
and multidisciplinary approaches for addressing their needs,
while preventing discrimination based on nationality, birth
status, immigration status, and statelessness. One sees a grave
danger that we relegate these children by virtue of their birthing
and family proximity to violence as non-children, impugning
responsibility when none is possible and effectively 'unchilding'
such children from the status of child itself.2 0 The logic corollary
to the moral hazard of 'unchilding' is that States should take all
necessary measures to avoid the stigmatization or creation of
further negative distinctions between children who were born of
rape, children who were recruited because of their vulnerable
birth status, or children who participated in hostilities enabled
by their birth status.
20. This

concept

of 'unchilding'

comes

from

NADERA SHALHOUB-

KEVORKIAN, INCARCERATED CHILDHOOD AND THE POLITICS OF UNCHILDING,

(Cambridge University Press, 2019); "Unchilding... operates profoundly

through the disruption of the intimate that is embodied in the bipolitical and
visceral as well as through the global and local politics of silence, negligence,
intervention and inaction: with wounding regulations and nonregulations

inherent in a geography of power within settler-colonial contexts that is
inherently and necessarily preoccupied with children." at 17.
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Let me turn in particular to a specific overlapping category
of women and children which has received little substantive
attention, namely children born of rape currently being held in
detention with their mothers in camps maintained and
securitized (for now) by SDF personnel or held in prisons in Iraq.
To address the status of these children, some consideration of
the context of their conception and birth is necessary. First,
there is increasingly robust evidence that some (here it is
difficult to accurately formulate precise numbers) girls and
women willingly travelled to join the ISIS and other non-State
actor groups. 21 They did so for the variety of reasons outlined in
the mobilization analysis (above). The extent to which consent
to travel to join a particular group, and to partake of its ideology
can be taken as consent to sexual encounters, marriage, and remarriage is deeply problematic, primarily from a criminal law
perspective. 22 Second, for specific groups sexually targeted by
ISIS including Yazidi girls and women, there is a broad
consensus that the attack, capture and slavery of this group
constitutes a crime against humanity, and is in breach of both
human rights and humanitarian norms. 2 3 Third, we have a
sizeable category of girls (defined as children under the
Convention of the Rights of the Child) who travelled without the
consent of parents or family to join ISIS. The methods by which
these young women were groomed to travel bears many of the
hallmarks of grooming associated with sex-trafficking. Sexual
acts with those young women who were minors when they
travelled is broadly considered statutory rape under many of the

21. See Hamoon Khelghat-Doost, Women of the Caliphate: The Mechanism
for Women's Incorporationinto the Islamic State (IS), 11 PERSP. ON TERRORISM
17, 17 25 (2017).
22. ISIS's Persecution of Women, COUNTER EXTREMISM PROJECT,
https://www.counterextremism.com/content/isiss -persecution-women
(last
visited Mar. 7, 2020) (noting that while certain fatwahs were issued requiring
female 'consent' to marriage, in practice there was sustained evidence of forced
marriage, as well as authorizations for early marriage).
23. Noting also that it appears religious justifications were applied to the
rape of certain women ISIS including a Quranic quote [Al-Mu'minun: 5 61 to
justify its policv of rape: "And [men] who guard their private parts, except from

their wives or those their right hands possess, for indeed, they will not be
blamed." As outlined in Dabiq, ISIS interpreted "those their right hands
possess" as a modern reference to slaves); Press Release, U.N. Off. of the Special
Rep. of the Sec. Gen. on Sexual Violence in Conflict, U.N. Representative for
Sexual Violence in Conflict Urges Support for Tracing and Return of Yazidi
Girls captured by ISIL (Sept. 17, 2015), https://www.un.org/sexualviolence
inconflict/press-release/un-special-representative-on-sexual-violence-inconflict-urges -support-for-tracing-and-return-of-yazidi-girls -captured-by-ISIS/.
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applicable domestic criminal laws of the countries they come
from. To this end, an unwillingness to see women and girls as
victims of terrorism presents another profound ethical
abdication of responsibility by States.
Finally, given what is known about the practices of multiple
and sequential marriages between the girls and women and the
fighters, there are trying questions about the degree of consent
in any of these arrangements. For example, if a girl or woman
originally willingly travelled to Iraq or Syria with a partner or
spouse, but then encountered unexpected social, economic,
familial disruptions or trauma, how one calculates the totality of
consent involves a testing and legally complex assessment. If the
same girl or women, after the death of a spouse or partner was
re-remarried without her consent or in highly coercive or
exploitative circumstances, 24 such a relationship and the sexual
aspects of it, including rape, would be considered in a different
light overall both in terms of applicable criminal law but also in
terms of addressing her continued citizenship status, and her
ability to return to her country of citizenship/origin. Bearing in
mind, that the capacity of any girl, woman, boy or man to
question the social structures and moral imperatives of the
Caliphate were extremely limited, 25 the outward expression of
dispute on one's status or disposition cannot be taken at facevalue.
Assessing the numbers of children conceived and born of
rape and/or sexual coercion is almost impossible. For the
purposes of this analysis, we can reasonably presume that an
indeterminate number of these children may have been born as
a result of rape. But it is also clear that there are deep political
cleavages in having concrete human rights compliant policies
and practice follow from widespread recognition that sexual
violence occurred during this conflict. In short, while many
governments may recognize that sexual violence took place on a
wide scale, this does not translate into a meaningful repatriation
policy, nor does it result in medical, social, economic or legal
support to women, girls and children on the ground. Moreover,
if support to and specifically tailored programs addressing the

24. United Nations Sec. Council, Counter-Terrorism Comm. Exec.
Directorate, The Challenge of Returning and Relocating Foreign Terrorist
Fighters: Research Perspectives, at 4 (2018) (noting that the death and casualty
rate on the battlefield was high).
25. See Khelgaht-Doost, supranote 21, at 17. (mentioning the regulation of
women's lives by ISIS created gender segregated parallel institutions).
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needs of children born of rape in conflict are a scarce commodity
correlated with structural gender discrimination particularly in
patriarchal and patrilineal societies, the potential for
transformative approaches are even more limited in Iraq and
26
Syria.
For straightforwardly (in the terms used by Western
counter-terrorism policy dictates) "innocent" victims of sexual
violence by ISIS, the most compelling and visible are Yazidi girls
and women, for whom there has been a rhetorical outpouring of
global sympathy. In reality, this wide-spread empathy is not
matched in practice by either accountability or restitution. There
has been little dispute in naming the harms to these girls and
women, such as systematic sexual violence, genocide, and crimes
against humanity. Many Yazidi religious leaders and their
community accept that their women and girls were abused
against their will and have created pathways for them to renter
their families and society, although not always for the children
they birthed. 2 7 The children birthed from such extreme violence
have received no such treatment, as the religious leaders have
issued no positive proclamations to accept these children, de
facto rejecting them and their mothers should they choose to
remain with their offspring.
Girls and women who travelled to North-East Syria and
Iraq-whether on their own initiative, to join spouses or under
family religious/social pressure, from on-line cyber grooming, 28
26. JOANNE NEENAN, CTR. FOR WOMEN, PEACE & SEC., LONDON SCHOOL
OF ECON. & POLITICAL SCI., CLOSING THE PROTECTION GAP FOR CHILDREN
BORN OF WAR: ADDRESSING STIGMATISATION AND THE INTERGENERATIONAL
IMPACT OF SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN CONFLICT (2017); BRIGITTE ROHWERDER,
REINTEGRATION OF CHILDREN BORN OF WARTIME RAPE 2 (2019) ('Their lack of

inclusion in policy making has been attributed to the perceived issue of a 'lack
of data', with children born of sexual violence generally being a hidden
population; ethical concerns about 'doing no harm' and fears around breaking
Iprotective silences', which may have deterred action; and 'the range of political
and cultural taboos and sensitivities children born of sexual violence bring to
the surface within conflict states and the international community."').
27. Brenda Stoter Boscolo, 'Every Mother Loves Her Child" Yazidi Women
Forcedto Give up ChildrenBorn of Rape by Islamic State Fighters,TELEGRAPH
(July 21, 2018, 1:00 PM), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2018/07/21/everymother-loves -child-yazidi-women-forced-give-children-born; see also Sahika
Yuksel et al., Genocidal Sexual Assault on Wormen and the Role of Culturein the

RehabilitationProcess:Experiencesfrom Working with Yazidi Women in Turkey
28 TORTURE: J. ON REHABILITATION TORTURE VICTIMS & PREVENTION TORTURE

124, 126 (2018).
28. See generally Susan S. M. Edwards, Cyber-Grooming Young Women for
Terrorist Activity: Dominant and Subjugated Explanatory Narratives, in
CYBERCRIME, ORGANIZED

CRIME, AND SOCIETAL RESPONSES 23 (Emilio C.
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or recruitment-face a deep reservoir of distrust, rejection and
are primarily viewed as security threats to their countries of
residence and origin. The ambivalence of these responses to the
girls and women who were members of or associated with ISIS
in various ways is illustrated by their treatment at the fall of the
Caliphate. Many of those not directly or indirectly killed in
combat as collateral damage are being held apparently now in
indefinite detention with little substantial movement on
ameliorating their living conditions or their long-term prospects.
To state the obvious, many of these women and girls are victims,
and many have experienced sexual violence in conflict. This
pointed reality appears to be ignored by their states of origin in
totalizing and dehumanizing narratives that fail utterly to
address the human rights and humanitarian norms that these
States are obliged to take account of. To denote this as a moral
failure is to state an obvious fact, to point out the long-term
security implications of such short-term thinking is to hit
another brick wall.
CONCLUSION
I take the view that the return of women and children to
countries of origin or nationality is the only comprehensive
response that amounts to a positive implementation of Security
Council resolutions 2178 (2014) and 2396 (2017) and is
considerate of States' long-term security interests. States have a
positive obligation to take necessary and reasonable steps to
intervene in favour of their nationals abroad, should there be
reasonable grounds to believe that they face treatment in
flagrant violation of international human rights law. This
includes flagrant denial of justice, the imposition of the death
penalty, torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment,
sexual violence, or deprivation of liberty in grave violation of
human rights standards, including arbitrary detention,
incommunicado detention, and detention that fails to comply
with the most basic standards of humanity.
I have had the responsibility to meet with many returnees
in my role as U.N. Special Rapporteur over the past three years.
These include imprisoned Jihadis, women, boys and girls after
their return from Syria and Iraq in countries, such as Belgium.
France and Kazakhstan. I have taken the time to listen without
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judgement to their stories, to hear what prompted them to
travel, to absorb the details of their daily lives, and to be present
to the ordinariness and exceptionality and brutality of the lives
they have lived. I have heard compelling stories from young
women about the way they were introduced to Islamic State online and come to know of the escape it appeared to offer from a
range of both mundane and oppressive family and social
circumstances; from young (now imprisoned) men who travelled
to Syria at a time in Europe when European States were talking
about the 'good fight' in Syria and the need to bring down Bashar
al-Assad and their subsequent transition through various armed
groups; I have heard intrepid stories from women to save their
children from a myriad of harms most of us cannot even imagine;
and crayon drawings hang in my office at the University of
Minnesota from children who spent their formative years in the
power of Islamic State and still drew the kinds of images all our
children draw when they are learning the first powers of
expression. All of this tells me that not only is return to countries
of origin a categorical imperative, but also that we have an
obligation to listen and fully comprehend the lives that they
lived in North-East Syria and Iraq, including our own
responsibilities to them. This is not to absolve individuals for
responsibility for serious violations of international law
including genocide, precisely the opposite, it is only by knowing
fully what happened will justice ever be done. It is also to avoid
the fundamental misstep of applying human rights norms in
inconsistent and selective ways, and only to victims we find easy
or sympathetic and whose lives are not compromised in any way.
In choosing that route in Iraq and North-East Syria, not only are
States betraying their obligations to particular individuals but
also they are, in fact, undermining the very foundations of
universal human rights norms and practice.

